The next round of services negotiations: identifying priorities and options by Bernard Hoekman
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS







he agreement to create a General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) was one of the major
innovations to emerge from the Uruguay round.
Trade in services was not covered by the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
even though such trade had always accounted for a
non-trivial share of the foreign exchange earnings
(expenditures) of many countries.  The best esti-
mates available suggest global trade in services—
deﬁned to include sales of services by afﬁliates 
of multinationals—stood at $2.2 trillion in 1997
(Table 1).  Clearly this is not a nontraded sector.
Given the novelty of the subject for trade
ofﬁcials, it was not surprising that most of the efforts
expended during the Uruguay Round negotiations
on services centered on conceptual and “architec-
tural” issues—how to deﬁne trade, what rules and
principles should apply to measures affecting this
trade, and devising mechanisms to determine the
coverage of the agreement.  No liberalization of trade
in services occurred during the Uruguay Round.
Instead, what emerged was a framework under
which liberalization could be pursued in the future,
with explicit commitments to engage in further
negotiations to liberalize trade in services ﬁve years
after the entry into force of the GATS, and periodi-
cally, thereafter.  Thus, new negotiations on services
were launched in 2000.
Although post-Uruguay Round sectoral negotia-
tions to expand the coverage of GATS in the areas 
of basic telecommunication and ﬁnancial services
attracted a signiﬁcant amount of media attention, the
GATS, itself, has not generated a lot of public interest.
Its provisions, let alone its existence, remain relatively
unknown or understood even among those who have
an interest in the functioning of the trading system.
No major disputes regarding the implementation of
the agreement have been brought forward, no doubt
reﬂecting, in part, that no liberalization was achieved.
This suggests the agreement is not perceived as par-
ticularly relevant to the various stakeholders, in partic-
ular, multinational business. Indeed, in the run up to
the coming negotiations, services industries have
made it clear that substantial efforts are required to
make the GATS more relevant to the needs of business,
in particular, as a tool for enhancing market access
conditions.1 There is wide recognition among both
the business community and government ofﬁcials
that the status quo is not an acceptable option, simply
because the existing schedules of commitments in
the GATS are not particularly useful.  The correspon-
dence between what is scheduled and the effective
barriers to trade and investment that are in force 
is rather loose, to say the least.  The question of how
to proceed on services is particularly acute for devel-
oping countries. Almost all governments increasingly
recognize the vital role that an efﬁcient and vibrant
service industry plays in the process of economic
and social development.  That is, certain services
are basic inputs or components of the economic
infrastructure, whereas other services can be a provi-
sional shelter useful for social stability.
In principle, the task confronting World Trade
Organization (WTO) members in the area of services
appears straightforward:  to achieve a signiﬁcant
degree of liberalization and “lock-in” through sched-
uling commitments in the GATS.  Realization of this
objective will require governments to identify where
domestic liberalization and policy reform would be
beneﬁcial from an economic development and
growth perspective.  Multilateral liberalization of
trade in services will be more difﬁcult to achieve
than in the case of merchandise trade, as the charac-
teristics of services and the policies restricting trade
in services lend themselves less readily to the
method of reciprocal exchange of market access
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“concessions.”  The challenge, therefore, is to develop
negotiation modalities that will encourage govern-
ments to use the GATS as a mechanism through which
to pursue desired domestic reforms.  This is a non-
trivial challenge.  The recent experience of regional
economic integration agreements that cover services
trade in Latin America illustrates that achieving liber-
alization by means of international agreements is
difﬁcult:  to date very little has been achieved (World
Bank, 2000).2
This paper discusses what might be negotiated in
the GATS and the WTO to promote liberalization of ser-
vices markets.  After brieﬂy recalling the possible ratio-
nales for engaging in multilateral trade negotiations
and international cooperation, the paper reviews
available information on—and analysis of—services
trade and trade barriers.  The discussion then turns
to options for making the GATS a more relevant
instrument of regulatory reform and market access,
and ends with some concluding remarks.
WHY NEGOTIATE? POTENTIAL GAINS
FROM COOPERATION
Many governments around the world have been
engaging in a process of economic reform that is, at
least partially, informed by the insight that policy
should be neutral in terms of creating incentives to
invest in particular activities.  Rather than tolerate
monopolies in sectors traditionally seen as natural
monopolies (e.g., telecoms, rail transport, ports), re-
forms have focused on encouraging competition.  De-
pending on local circumstances and political constel-
lations, governments may face more or less opposi-
tion to reforms that aim to increase competition in
services markets.  Although often supported by the
manufacturing sector, which has an interest in having
access to a wide array of efﬁciently produced services
inputs, ﬁnal consumers may oppose liberalization be-
cause of concerns about a reduction in the frequency
or geographical coverage of services, such as in tele-
coms and transport, and increases in market prices as
subsidies are eliminated.  Labor unions may be con-
cerned about the potential for large-scale layoffs, and
those in society who have beneﬁted from subsidized
access to services may resist a change in the status
quo that is expected to raise prices or restrict supply.
Thus, governments may be constrained in imple-
menting reforms that would beneﬁt society at large
because of the opposition of politically powerful,
vested interests.  If so, international trade agreements
offer a potential way for breaking domestic deadlocks
by mobilizing groups to support reform.  The tradi-
tional raison d’etre of the GATT is that groups that
would beneﬁt from better access to export markets
are induced to throw their weight behind import lib-
eralization.  Analogous reasoning applies in the
services context, with the difference that for many
countries, export interests in services may be weaker
than in manufacturing or agriculture because ser-
vices are more difﬁcult to trade.  If so, there is greater
need to mobilize support from exporters of real
goods that require access to competitively priced and
high-quality service inputs if they are to be able to
contest global markets.  This, in turn, puts a high pre-
mium on the availability of information and analysis
of the economic impact of status quo services poli-
cies.  However, given that foreign direct investment
(FDI) is a signiﬁcant mode of supplying non-tradable
services, potential direct investors may have a strong
export interest and supply the traditional political
economy dynamics that have driven the GATT talks.
In addition to potentially assisting in changing
the political economy of reform, international agree-
2 However, there have been a few integration agreements that have
managed to achieve progressive liberalization. Abstracting from the
special case of the European Communities, the primary example is
the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement between Australia
and New Zealand.
International Transactions Services 
by Modes of Supply, 1997
GATS Mode Value Cumulative Share
of Supply Category ($ billion) (percent)
Mode 1  Commercial services  890 41.0
(excl. travel)
Mode 2  Travel 430 19.8
Mode 3  Gross output  820 37.8
of foreign afﬁliates
Mode 4  Compensation  30 1.4
of employees
Total 2,170               100.0
NOTE:  Modes 1, 2, and 4 are derived from balance-of-pay-
ments data.
SOURCE:  Karsenty (2000).
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ments also can help provide focal points for regula-
tory reform and provide templates for domestic
policy measures that are welfare enhancing, such as
support for the implementation of pro-competitive
regulatory regimes.  This is particularly important 
in the case of network-type services, such as in ﬁnan-
cial or telecom services, where there is a need to deal
with problems of asymmetric information or to ensure
universal service.  One of the beneﬁcial “didactic” out-
comes of the negotiations on ﬁnancial services was
that it helped educate decision makers on the impor-
tance of distinguishing between liberalization and (de)
regulation.  Liberalization involves the elimination of
discrimination in the treatment of foreign and national
services providers and removal of market access bar-
riers—to both cross-border provision and establish-
ment.  But, this does not restrict the government's
ability to enforce regulatory regimes, undertake 
prudential supervision, conduct monetary policy, 
or manage external capital ﬂows (Key, 1997).3 The
same applies to other sectors.  In all cases, however,
the required regulatory capacity must be there, if
needed.  In principle, multilateral negotiations can
help by identifying good regulatory practices and
principles that governments should consider adopt-
ing, as well as criteria or necessary conditions that
must be met before certain reforms should be under-
taken.4
Finally, an important potential beneﬁcial role
that multilateral agreements can play is to enhance
the credibility of a government’s economic policy
stance.  This can be very important for countries
where there is a history of policy reversal.  The GATS
offers a mechanism for governments to precommit
to a reform path, by spelling out what will be done
over a period of time, as well as lock-in reforms that
have already been achieved.  A number of govern-
ments used the Agreement on Basic Telecommuni-
cations as a precommitment device—probably the
most constructive use that has been made of the
GATS to date by WTO members.  Clearly the strength
of the enforcement mechanisms that can be invoked
plays an important role in determining the “credibil-
ity impact” of multilateral commitments.  Although
the WTO has one of the strongest and most effective
enforcement mechanisms of any international agree-
ment, one of the problems that it confronts is that it
relies excessively on export interests to contest viola-
tions of an agreement.  This can greatly reduce the
“credibility payoff” for small countries, as exporters
in large nations may have little interest in “suing”
such countries (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000).
WHAT IS AT STAKE? IDENTIFYING THE
BARRIERS AND THE GAINS FROM
COOPERATION
To participate effectively and maximize the bene-
ﬁts of GATS negotiations, it is vital that governments
have a well-deﬁned domestic reform agenda they desire
to pursue.  They also must know what the major bar-
riers to their exports are.  Ideally, governments should
use multilateral negotiations to pursue domestic re-
forms that are desired in any event, seeking better
access to export markets in the process.  A major prob-
lem confronting governments is the determination of
priorities—both for domestic reform and regarding
foreign market access barriers.  Without good infor-
mation on what policies—at home and abroad—are
most detrimental to economic growth and export
development, a government cannot maximize the
beneﬁts of participating in a multilateral negotiation.
In principle, a general equilibrium approach is
required to identify which domestic sectors deserve
priority attention and determine the overall impact
of status-quo policies and possible reforms.  This is
non-trivial, as the need extends beyond considering
the interactions between the various sectors of the
economy to a general equilibrium assessment of
policies to identify regulatory reforms required as a
consequence of liberalization initiatives.  The absence
of an economy-wide framework often results in
highly non-uniform patterns of protection for indus-
tries that are detrimental to the long-term growth
prospects of the economy.  An illustration is provided
by the emerging markets that were embroiled in
financial crisis in the late 1990s.  The banking crisis
in Asia, in part, was the result of one sector, banking,
remaining highly protected and badly regulated
during a period in which substitute services in the
form of short-term capital ﬂows were being liberal-
ized and the electronic “transportation” costs of
moving these funds were declining rapidly (Hoek-
man and Messerlin, 2000).  The problem is in
ensuring that such situations do not occur.  Informa-
tion and analysis must play a major role in this regard.
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From a negotiation perspective, care must be taken
not to commit to an inappropriate sequencing of
reforms, or an outcome that is unbalanced in the
sense of neglecting important complementary activi-
ties or sectors.
The need to consider regulatory reform (be it
deregulation or strengthening of regulatory oversight)
is especially prominent in the context of services to
ensure that the binding constraints on entry and
competition are relaxed.  Of particular importance
for trade in services is the impact of—and rationale
for—restrictions on inward FDI, both entry (owner-
ship) limitations and operating requirements.  Despite
the worldwide liberalization of FDI that has occurred
in the last decade, policies often remain restrictive,
especially as regards equity (ownership) limits.  The-
oretical work has begun to emerge exploring the
potential effects of FDI restrictions on services.  This
research strongly supports the conventional wisdom
that FDI is beneﬁcial to host economies—not only
because it is a source of new knowledge and compe-
titive pressure, but also because FDI in services can
increase the demand for skilled workers and help host
countries to begin to produce and export advanced
products (Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr, 1999).  This
work suggests that the rationale for ownership restric-
tions may be weak if it has the effect of inhibiting entry.
It is crucial to identify and consider the rationales
for policies that limit competition in services.  A full-
fledged computable general equilibrium (CGE) ap-
proach is often impossible given resource constraints
and the absence of data at the detailed sectoral level.
It may be more productive to deﬁne a “cluster” ap-
proach that groups sets of interdependent activities
together and focuses on the policies that affect the
efﬁciency of the various elements of the cluster.  Input-
output tables and social accounting matrices can be
used to determine the various clusters of activities
and their major inputs.  But, they must be comple-
mented by surveys of the businesses producing and
REVIEW
T op 15 Service Trading Countries And Economies With The Highest 
Relative Specialization In Cross-Border Services, 1997
Cumulative Cumulative Countries with Highest
Share Share Share Share Revealed Comparative 
Importers: (percent) (percent) Exporters: (percent) (percent) Advantage
United States  11.1 11 United States  16.7 17 Kiribati 71
Japan  9.9 21 UK  7.8 25 Nepal 54
Germany  8.0 29 Japan  7.2 32 Mozambique 53
Italy  5.9 35 Germany  6.6 38 Neth. Antilles 52
France  5.1 40 France  5.9 44 Cape Verde 52
UK 4.8 45 Netherlands  4.8 49 Greece 37
Netherlands  3.7 49 Italy  4.7 54 Egypt 37
Canada  2.7 51 Belgium 3.2 57 Djibouti 36
Belgium 2.6 54 Hong Kong 3.0 60 Ethiopia 34
Korea  2.4 56 Singapore  2.7 63 Philippines 32
China  2.2 58 Korea  2.3 65 Vanuatu 30
Spain  2.2 61 Canada  2.3 67 Latvia 29
Taiwan  1.8 62 Switzerland  2.0 69 Samoa 28
Malaysia  1.7 64 Spain  1.9 71 Jordan 27
Austria  1.6 66 Austria  1.7 73 Antigua and Barbuda 26
NOTE:  The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of country i for product j is measured by the item’s share in the country’s exports 
relative to its share in world trade.  That is, if xij is the value of country i’s exports of j, and Xtj is the country’s total exports, its revealed
comparative advantage index is: RCAij = (xij/Xtj) 4 (Xiw/Xtw).
SOURCE:  Karsenty (2000).
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using the services involved to identify the main policies
that restrict competition.  Such an approach could be
used in the GATS context to identify the bundle of
activities and policies on which commitments should
be sought or made.  For example, making a market-
access commitment for hotels with a view to encour-
aging tourism-related investment may have little effect
if there are restrictions on air transport to or zoning
regulations in favored areas that prevent new entry.
Similar considerations apply to multimodal transport,
express courier services, and value-added information
services.  While obvious, and generally an approach
that is followed in domestic policy-making, the “cluster”
approach does not appear to be employed at the
multilateral negotiating level (Hoekman and Mes-
serlin, 2000).
It also is important to identify and reduce the
major barriers maintained by potential trading part-
ners that restrict exports, temporary entry of services
providers, and/or outward FDI.  Developing countries
have a large stake in being able to contest foreign ser-
vices markets.  Although the large Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries dominate global trade in services, develop-
ing countries dominate the list of countries that are
most specialized in (dependent on) services exports
as a source of foreign exchange (Table 2).  In most
instances this reﬂects the importance of tourism and/
or transportation services.  But, developing countries
also have become large exporters of transactions pro-
cessing, back-ofﬁce services (Jamaica) or information
and software development services (India).  The poten-
tial to exploit recent and emerging technological
developments—such as E-commerce—that allow
cross-border trade in services and provide ﬁrms with
incentives to slice up the value chain geographically
is enormous (UNCTAD and World Bank, 1994; Hoek-
man and Primo Braga, 1997). 
Relatively little information is available on the
barriers that restrict international trade in services.
Governments and negotiators ran into this constraint
during the Uruguay Round, and some progress has
been made since then in improving the database for
negotiations.  Most effort has gone into better mea-
surement of stocks and ﬂows, and advances have
been made, especially in developed countries
(Karsenty, 2000; Whichard, 1999).  Much less has
been done on the policy side.  In large part, this
reﬂects the immense difﬁculty of identifying and
quantifying barriers to services trade.  These difﬁcul-
ties are well known and will not be elaborated here.
A major problem with the GATS is that the positive
list approach to scheduling commitments does not
generate comprehensive and economically meaningful
data on the measures that are imposed by countries.
Absent a careful and comprehensive sector-by-sector
assessment on a country-by-country basis, the only
way to get a handle on the relative magnitude of bar-
riers to trade in services is through indirect methods.
Various approaches are possible, and efforts have
recently been made to use some of these.
One is to build on recent improvements in trade
and FDI ﬂow data to construct measures of “revealed”
openness.  That is, the pattern of bilateral trade can
be compared with a measure of what trade should
be.  A ﬁrst attempt to do this has been undertaken 
by Francois and Hoekman (1999), who ﬁt a gravity
model to bilateral trade in services ﬂows between the
United States and its partner countries to estimate
tariff equivalents for each partner country’s or
region’s barriers to trade in services.  The results
for business/ﬁnance and construction services are
reported in Table 3.  Assuming Hong Kong and Singa-
pore are appropriate “free trade” benchmarks, the
estimates for business/ﬁnancial services suggest that
although average services barriers are often above
applied average tariffs on manufactures, in many
countries services barriers are not very high.  Indeed,
in some cases the average merchandise tariff is
signiﬁcantly greater than the estimated services tariff
equivalent (South and Southeast Asia, Middle East,
and North Africa).  The highest services tariff equiva-
lent estimate is 36 percent (for Brazil). Japan, China,
Turkey, and South Asia follow with 20 percent rates.
All in all, the trade-based estimates suggest barriers
to trade in business services may not be very large. 
This is not the case for construction, the other
service sector for which there is detailed bilateral
trade data for the United States.  Here we see much
higher barrier estimates, as would be expected given
the resistance in most countries to allowing foreign
construction ﬁrms to bid for procurement contracts
and existing barriers to movement of semiskilled
workers.  Tariff equivalent estimates are in the 40–60
percent range for China, South Asia, Brazil, Turkey,
Central Europe, Russia, and South Africa.  For OECD
countries they are lower, but still signiﬁcant, in the
10-30 percent range.  Clearly, these estimates are sen-
sitive to a variety of factors, not least of which is the
treatment of U.S. ﬁrms as opposed to ﬁrms from
other countries in this sector.  Low construction tariff
equivalent estimates for North America presumably
reﬂect in part the operation of North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whereas the low numbers36 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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f or countries like Indonesia and the Middle East may
reﬂect oil-related and defense activity.
Another source of information used by Francois
and Hoekman (1999) is ﬁnancial data reported by
ﬁrms listed on stock exchanges.  One global database
with such information that is often used by ﬁnancial
analysts is Worldscope (1998).  This contains ﬁnan-
cial data on all ﬁrms listed on stock exchanges all
over the world.  While the reported data do not pro-
vide enough information to calculate marginal costs
—so price-cost margins cannot be calculated—they
do allow gross operating margins to be calculated on a
Estimated Tariff Equivalents In Traded Services:
Gravity-Model Based Regression Method (Percent)
Countries/Regions: Average Tariff on  Business/Construction Financial Services
Merchandise*
North America
+ 6.0 8.2 9.8
Western Europe 6.0 8.5 18.3
Australia and New Zealand 5.0 6.9 24.4
Japan 6.0 19.7 29.7
China 18.0 18.8 40.9
Taiwan n.a. 2.6 5.3
Other NICs n.a. 2.1 10.3
Indonesia 13.0 6.8 9.6
Other South East Asia 10.0 5.0 17.7
India 30.0 13.1 61.6
Other South Asia ** 25.0 20.4 46.3
Brazil 15.0 35.7 57.2
Other Latin America 12.0 4.7 26.0
Turkey ** 13.0 20.4 46.3
Middle East and North Africa 20.0 4.0 9.5
CEECs + Russia 10.0 18.4 51.9
South Africa 6.0 15.7 42.1
Other Sub-Saharan Africa n.a. 0.3 11.1
Rest of World n.a. 20.4 46.3
NOTE:  The basic methodology is to estimate a gravity equation vis-à-vis U.S. trade, using exports as the dependent variable and per-
capita income, GDP, and a dummy for Western Hemisphere countries as regressors.  Hong Kong and Singapore are considered to be free
trade “benchmarks” in the regressions, and deviations from predicted imports, relative to this free trade benchmark, are taken as an
indication of barriers to trade.  These are backed out from a constant elasticity import demand function as follows:  T1/T0 = (M1/M0) x
(1/e), where T1 is the power of the tariff equivalent, and M1/M0 is the ratio of actual to predicted imports (normalized relative to the free
trade benchmark ratio for Hong Kong and Singapore), and e is the demand elasticity (assumed to be –4). 
* Tariff averages are unweighted across all commodities and for the latest available year, in many cases 1997 or 1998.  Country cover-
age of regions is not comprehensive.  Reported ﬁgures should be regarded as indicative of the prevailing order of magnitude only.
** Turkey and Other South Asia are not available, separately, in the U.S. data, and have been assigned estimated rest of world values.
+  North America values involve assigning Canada/Mexico numbers to the U.S.
SOURCE:  Francois and Hoekman (1999) and World Bank estimates.
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sector-by-sector basis across countries.5 These can
be used to infer whether a government’s policy
stance is more or less restrictive as regards entry and
competition.  In general, a large number of factors
will determine the ability of ﬁrms to generate high
margins, including market size (number of ﬁrms), the
business cycle, the state of competition policy en-
forcement, the substitutability of products, ﬁxed costs,
etc.  Notwithstanding the impossibility of inferring
that high margins are due to high barriers, there should
be a correlation between the two across countries for
any given sector.  Data on operating margins provide
some sense of the relative proﬁtability of activities,
and therefore, the relative magnitude (restrictiveness)
of the barriers to entry/exit that may exist.  Of partic-
ular interest are differences in average margins across
manufacturing and services in different countries.
Given that services are less tradable than goods and
entry barriers for foreign competitors are generally
higher due to the need for establishment (which is
costly, if allowed at all), margins can be expected to
be higher for services.  But variations in the magnitude
of the services mark-up across countries may tell us
something about the prevalence of barriers.
Average operating margins for all ﬁrms in manu-
facturing and services are reported in Table 4, columns
2 and 3.  The numbers suggest that services margins
are signiﬁcantly higher than manufacturing margins,
generally ranging 10–15 percentage points above
those in manufacturing.  More interesting is the
extent to which the mark-up varies across countries.
In only three cases are operating margins similar
and/or relatively low (less than 25 percent), suggest-
ing that these are countries where service sectors are
quite competitive:  Australia, Japan, and Korea. Thai-
land and China are countries with the highest
markup over average margins in manufacturing.
Malaysia is another example where service margins
are a multiple of those in manufacturing.  The mark-
up also is quite large in the United States.
Sectoral data on operating margins also are
reported in Table 4, using the (U.S.) Standard Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation (SIC).  The data illustrate again how
difﬁcult it is to infer anything about the state of com-
petition, given instances of negative margins in some
cases.  But, they are again suggestive.  For example,
margins for hotels and ﬁnancial services ﬁrms tend
to be quite high relative to other service sectors in
many countries, while wholesale and retail trade, and
the consulting sector have margins that are in the 20
percent range or less.  If the United States is taken as
a competitive benchmark country—which may not
be appropriate given high margins in some sectors
(such as business services) relative to those, say, in
the European Union—it can be observed that in
many developing countries margins are signiﬁcantly
higher.  One immediate explanation for this may be
that in many developing countries there are fewer
firms in a sector—frequently there are less than ten,
and sometimes there is only one.  It is not surprising
that in such cases margins can become very high.
Examples are recreational services in Taiwan and
Thailand; business services in Indonesia; construction
in Chile; consulting in China; and hotels in Taiwan,
Indonesia, and China.  Thus, there is some evidence
that policies may be in place in developing countries
that restrict competition and allow incumbent ﬁrms
to garner rents.
Data on operating margins can, in principle, be
used in a variety of ways to inform the analysis.  One
is to use the difference between a benchmark “open”
country’s average margins and those of the other
countries as a measure of the extent to which the
latter are more protectionist.  This can be a useful
way of scaling the level of protection that is assumed
to prevail in all the other countries.  The difference
between manufacturing and service margins also
might be used as a scaling factor to estimate the
prevailing tariff equivalent.  Thus, if the margin for
a speciﬁc service sector is double that in manufac-
turing, one might argue that the prevailing tariff
equivalent should be at least twice as large as the
average tariff on manufacturing.  If this approach
were to be followed, the end result would not be that
different from the tariff equivalents that are obtained
by running gravity model regressions—services pro-
tection estimates that are no more than double the
average merchandise tariff.
An alternative approach to assess the prevalence
of barriers to trade in services involves efforts to con-
struct openness indicators for modes of supply, espe-
cially FDI, or for speciﬁc sectors, using qualitative
assessments of the extent to which actual policies
raise the costs of entry and/or operation post-entry.6
Many of the relevant papers using this approach have
been written by a team of Australian academics and
staff of the Australian Productivity Commission, and
are collected in Findlay and Warren (2000).  This
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approach is potentially more relevant than the indi-
rect measures discussed above, as the focus of GATS
negotiations is on speciﬁc policies and policy disci-
plines.  The basic method is to identify existing
policies affecting entry and operations post-entry,
assign each a weight, based on interviews of the 
private sector, and sum across weights to obtain an
overall restrictiveness index (Hardin and Holmes,
1997).  The results suggest that across Asian-Paciﬁc
Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries—which
have been the primary focus of attention—commu-
nications, ﬁnancial services, and transport are subject
to the greatest barriers to FDI, reﬂecting the existence
of ownership limits or outright bans on foreign own-
ership (Table 5).  The most restrictive countries include
Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and China.  As noted
above, these are all countries that also report high
margins for service sectors.  Similar compilations
could be done usefully for other regions.
By far, the most attention to date has been devoted
to telecom and ﬁnancial services.  Openness indica-
tors for both sectors have been constructed using
similar approaches of building indices that weigh
policies according to a subjective measure of the
extent to which each measure is a binding constraint.
A representative example of indices for ﬁnancial ser-
vice activities in a number of Asian countries con-
structed by Claessens and Glaessner (1998) is reported
in Table 6.  They illustrate that many countries in the
region are much more restrictive towards foreign
entry than the most liberal economy in the region,
Hong Kong.  Claessens and Glaessner (1998) also
make an assessment of the commitments that were
made by countries under the GATS Financial Services
Agreement.  They conclude that in many instances
the prevailing regulatory stance is not more liberal
than the country’s GATS commitment, and that in
some cases, GATS commitments are more liberal
Average Gross Operating Margins of Firms Listed on National Stock
Exchanges, 1994-96, by Sector (percent)
Mnftg. All Rec. Business Const. Consult. Finance Health Hotels Retail Whole- Trans./
Services Services sale Util.
Australia 15.5 16.6 17.9 13.8 15.3 7.0 41.0 27.3 7.9 9.1
Canada 22.6 32.9 60.1 51.7 14.4 19.2 44.5 2.3 67.8 12.0 16.0 36.5
Chile 40.8 44.0 68.7 55.2 21.3 27.9 46.8
China 28.1 49.5 45.9 67.1 34.0 77.5 24.4 25.5 46.9
EU 23.8 31.6 42.5 32.1 19.3 22.1 51.6 22.3 23.7 23.6 19.9 32.6
Hong Kong 12.8 18.1 6.5 12.9 11.5 25.4 31.3 10.1 6.9 31.0
Indonesia 34.3 41.3 81.1 22.9 25.3 53.6 68.2 26.4 24.8 45.3
Japan 26.4 28.7 28.1 31.6 14.2 28.6 40.5 40.1 27.2 32.9 15.6 20.6
Rep. Korea 25.7 25.8 41.2 15.3 26.7 14.9 31.2
Malaysia 6.0 21.6 13.3 18.3 14.7 28.3 24.3 38.7 11.2 10.8 30.7
Mexico 39.3 37.2 19.6 25.7 37.3 33.3 49.6 28.4 25.0 51.0
New Zealand 16.6 26.8 13.8 57.6 26.9 6.6 19.7 35.6
Philippines 28.6 42.3 19.9 40.2 53.9 55.8 43.9 40.3 42.3
Singapore 11.1 22.0 46.7 8.6 10.6 7.7 46.3 29.2 28.2 5.4 7.9 28.0
Taiwan 25.1 41.3 79.9 36.3 21.6 11.1 64.8 74.5 21.5 23.2 38.9
Thailand 27.3 52.6 85.4 35.8 38.1 –8.8 60.3 40.6 55.5 44.2 25.6 56.7
United States 21.2 42.3 46.8 56.2 20.2 56.3 37.0 48.5 34.6 27.0 43.4
Other Cairns  31.1 39.0 28.9 26.2 69.8 29.3 64.6 24.2 22.9 52.4
NOTE:  Data are three-year averages. See Francois and Hoekman (1999) for details on the number of ﬁrms and calculations.
SOURCE:  Francois and Hoekman (1999), drawing on Worldscope (1998).
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than actual practice.  That is, in the latter cases the
governments concerned made liberalization (pre)
commitments (e.g., Thailand and India on banking;
India and Indonesia on securities; and Hong Kong,
Indonesia, and the Philippines on insurance).  A sim-
ilar exercise undertaken by Warren (2000) for
telecoms is reported in Figure 1.  It suggests that
China, Korea, and Turkey have the highest restrictions,
while the United States, Japan, and Australia have
among the lowest. Unfortunately, this ranking cannot
be readily compared to the one suggested by the
margins, given differences in sectoral aggregation
used by authors. 
Summing up, business services, consultancy, and
distribution do not appear to be among the most pro-
tected sectors.  The tariff equivalent estimates based
on U.S. bilateral trade data, the gross operating mar-
gins, and the various measures of openness suggest
barriers to competition are higher in transportation,
ﬁnance, and telecommunications.  These are also
basic “backbone” inputs that are crucial to the ability
of enterprises to compete internationally. With the
exception of transportation—which has not been dis-
cussed much above—policies towards these sectors
appear to be signiﬁcantly more restrictive in devel-
oping countries.  Many key transport services are, of
course, outside the GATS. Major examples are air and
maritime transport and it is well known that in both
sectors government restrictions on competition and
new entry are frequently severe.7 This suggests nego-
tiating attention should focus on ﬁnancial services,
telecoms and transport.8
Estimating the Gains from Liberalization:
Results of Recent Research
A number of efforts have been made recently to
apply CGE techniques to assess the impact of service
sector reform.  Two noteworthy attempts explicitly
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
7 See Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000), Francois and Wooton (1999) and
Mukherjee (1999) for studies on maritime transport.
8 The construction sector is sometimes singled out as an important one
for developing countries in terms of potential exports. The data here are
not consistent—tariff equivalent estimates based on trade data are rela-
tively high (as expected), but margins and openness indicators suggest
that competition in this sector is often relatively vigorous. 
FDI Restrictiveness Indices for Selected APEC Economies and Selected Sectors
Business Communications Construction Distribution Education Finance Transport
Australia 18 44 18 18 18 45 20
Canada 23 51 20 20 20 38 24
China 36 82 40 28 53 45 46
Hong Kong 2 35 0 5 0 23 9
Indonesia 56 64 53 5 53 55 53
Japan 6 35 5 5 20 36 11
Korea 57 69 75 63 55 88 57
Malaysia 32 42 78 8 8 61 12
Mexico 29 74 45 33 45 55 28
New Zealand 9 43 8 8 8 20 13
Philippines 48 76 48 48 48 95 98
Singapore 26 52 25 25 25 38 25
Thailand 78 84 78 78 78 88 78
US 1 35 0 0 0 20 3
NOTE:  The higher the score, the greater the degree to which an industry is restricted.  Numbers range between 0 and 100 and are
indices constructed as a weighted average of ownership limits; equity restrictions on takeovers; screening policies; control restrictions,
and operational restrictions.
SOURCE:  Adapted from Hardin and Holmes (1997, Appendix A.2); numbers have been rounded up to the nearest integer.
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allow for FDI in services.  This is crucial, given the
importance of this mode of supply to contest service
markets.  Dee and Hanslow (1999) use the telecom
and ﬁnancial (banking) services openness indices to
estimate the impact of barriers to trade in services
using a CGE model.  One innovation here is to explic-
itly allow not only for entry through FDI, but also to
distinguish between entry and operating restrictions.
According to their estimates, barriers to establish-
ment (entry via FDI) are generally much higher than
restrictions on ongoing operations of foreign afﬁli-
ates.  Thus, barriers to entry, in the form of implicit
taxes on foreign capital, are the primary source of
restriction in many developing Asian economies.
They conclude that the global welfare effect of ser-
vices liberalization is roughly the same order of mag-
nitude as that associated with full liberalization of
barriers to trade in merchandise (agriculture and
manufactures).  However, the impact of these two 
liberalization scenarios differs signiﬁcantly across
countries.  For economies such as China, Hong Kong,
and Indonesia the gains from services liberalization
are a multiple of the gains associated with goods lib-
eralization; while the converse is true for countries
such as New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Singapore,
Taiwan, the European Union, and the United States.
China alone would capture two-thirds of the global
gain from services liberalization; the European Union
and the United States would lose.  In large part, this
reﬂects induced changes in the pattern of FDI stocks
and an associated loss in rents to the main providers
of FDI.  Because no information is available on the
prevailing level and distribution of rents generated by
status-quo policies, these results must be taken as
indicative only.  However, they illustrate the impor-
tance of undertaking empirical work in this area.9 
Brown and Stern (1999) use a three-sector multi-
country global CGE model to assess the impact of
liberalization of services trade and FDI.  Firms are
taken to be monopolistically competitive, with each
ﬁrm producing a set of products that are differenti-
ated both by the original R&D undertaken at head-
quarters that deﬁnes the “basic” product, and by the
ﬁnal location of production.  Firms locate production
for export or for local consumption depending on
Financial Services Openness Indices (1=most closed, 5=most open)
Banking Securities Insurance Capital Controls
GATS Actual GATS Actual GATS Actual
Commitment Practice Commitment Practice Commitment  Practice Practice
Hong Kong 4.20 4.75 4.00 4.40 4.40 4.00 4.80
Indonesia 3.15 3.20 3.50 3.00 3.10 2.60 3.60
South Korea 1.10 1.70 1.70 2.10 1.20 2.60 2.65
Malaysia 2.40 2.40 2.50 2.50 2.10 2.10 2.80
Philippines 2.80 3.35 2.40 2.40 2.90 2.80 2.45
Singapore 2.25 2.50 2.70 2.70 4.10 4.10 4.40
Thailand 2.95 2.85 2.00 2.00 2.80 2.80 4.20
India 2.70 2.25 2.50 2.10 1.00 1.00 1.50
Average 2.69 2.88 2.66 2.65 2.70 2.75 3.30
Source:  Claessens and Glaessner (1998).
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9 Considering whether regulatory barriers generate rents is an impor-
tant issue that tends to be neglected in numerical modeling work. The
greater the extent to which regulatory and administrative practices
give rise to resource costs (frictional or transactions costs), the greater
the welfare improvement that may result from reform. Hoekman and
Konan (1999) use a CGE model of Egypt to assess the orders of magni-
tude that may be involved in eliminating service-sector inefﬁciencies.
They conclude that Egyptian GDP might expand by some 10 percent
of its current GDP if policies are cost-raising.the type of barriers restraining the conduct of multi-
nationals.  These barriers are assumed to take two
forms:  (i) an ad valorem tax on local capital installed;
and (ii) foreign afﬁliate ﬁrms may face a policy-
induced ﬁxed cost of production for local operations.
Free entry is assumed, ensuring that proﬁts are zero.
Brown and Stern use the markup data reported in
Francois and Hoekman (1999) as a measure of the
barriers that exist to entry (establishment) by foreign
ﬁrms.  Their results reveal that, assuming a ﬁxed
global capital stock that is perfectly mobile, the wel-
fare impacts from global liberalization may be huge,
with some countries registering increases of up to 30
percent of GDP, and others suffering losses of almost
equivalent magnitude.  The sign and magnitude of
induced welfare changes largely reﬂect whether a
country attracts capital (FDI).  If the constant global
capital stock assumption is abandoned and allow-
ance is made for an induced increase in the capital
stock—which can be expected given a rise in the
return to capital—the dispersion in outcomes across
countries falls substantially, and almost all countries
experience an expansion in output and welfare. Wel-
fare numbers are huge, ranging from 15–40 percent
for many countries.
Robinson, Wang, and Martin (1999), and Chadha
(1999) use “guesstimates” of the relative restrictiveness
of services policies as revealed by the comprehensive-
ness of their GATS commitments compiled by Hoek-
man (1996) as inputs into CGE analyses.  Robinson et
al. (1999) conclude that liberalization of cross-border
trade in services—FDI is ignored—can have signiﬁ-
cant positive effects, especially if account is taken of
dynamic effects (the increases in total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) due to technology transfer via expansion
of trade in capital goods and intermediate inputs).
They ﬁnd that the welfare gain for the world from 
a 50 percent cut in service protection is ﬁve times
larger than full elimination of merchandise trade 
barriers.  This reﬂects the importance of transport
services and backward and forward linkages between
and among services and goods sectors.  Chadha (1999)
uses a multicountry CGE model that separates out
India, and runs simulations making different assump-
tions regarding prevailing market structures in agri-
culture, manufacturing, and services.  He concludes
that Indian welfare would expand by 0.7 to 1.4 per-
cent of GDP following a 25 percent global reduction
in the assumed vector of services protection.  Other
South Asian countries and Southeast Asian countries
are expected to register gains equivalent to 3 percent
of GDP.  These numbers are quite large relative to
what is usually found using similar types of models to
assess the impact of merchandise trade liberalization.
Summing up, although the data situation is not
very good, quite a bit can be done by analysts to
quantify the relative magnitude of prevailing barriers
and the magnitude and distribution of the gains of
increasing competition on services markets.  The
challenge is to do it, and build on recent and ongoing
research.  The research clearly suggests that potential
gains from liberalization may be very large.10 While
this work is important and useful, the state of the
data on barriers is such that, in the near term, policy-
makers will have to continue to rely primarily on
rules of thumb in determining negotiating priorities.
Basic economics suggests that the focus of attention
should be on the contestability of markets (artiﬁcial
entry restrictions) and deﬁning clusters of activities
that are interdependent.  There is a growing literature
that provides rules of thumb or criteria to identify
whether an acceptable level of competition exists in
a given service industry at a given period of time.  For
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10  This conclusion is bolstered by recent theoretical work, which has
identiﬁed a number of additional linkages between goods and ser-
vices markets that expand the gains from liberalization.  See, e.g.,
Deardorff (1999), Francois and Wooton (1999) and Markusen,
Rutherford and Tarr (1999).42 JULY/AUGUST 2000
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instance, air routes with less than three operating air-
lines are unlikely to be under intensive competition,
and large gains from regulatory reforms can be ex-
pected (Morrison and Winston, 1997).  In the case 
of multimodal competition (such as between trains
and airlines), price comparisons between similar air
routes with and without multimodal competition can
be a good proxy for assessing the capacity of regula-
tory reforms to deliver the beneﬁts of increased com-
petition.  This type of work also requires research and
analysis, but is more straightforward to undertake for
government agencies. But, here again, the challenge
is to do it.  Without such efforts, appropriate negoti-
ating priorities cannot be determined.  In short,
beneﬁting from GATS negotiations requires a large
amount of preparatory work, something that many
countries have not been engaged in.  As a result, the
process of negotiations is likely to be driven more 
by well-organized export interests in industrialized
countries, as was the case in the Uruguay Round.
This is not necessarily bad, but it is unlikely to maxi-
mize the potential gains from negotiation.
WHAT TO NEGOTIATE?
The next set of negotiations on services are likely
to focus primarily on (i) expanding the coverage of
speciﬁc commitments; and (ii) improving multilateral
rules.11 However, it can be argued that priority
should also be given to increasing information on
prevailing policies.
Towards Full Transparency
Given the weakness of the available data on bar-
riers, governments must rely on their private sectors
to inform them on what they think matters, and on
their economists to tell them what types (clusters) of
regulatory reforms are in the national interest.  A key
weakness of the GATS is that it does not force mem-
bers to “come clean” regarding the measures that are
used to restrict the ability of foreigners to contest
domestic service markets.  The positive list approach
used to schedule commitments often has been criti-
cized for this reason, although it can be defended on
the basis that a negative list would have been too
cumbersome to make operational at the time of the
Uruguay Round.12 It is very unlikely that negotiators
will be willing to reopen the issue of scheduling com-
mitments, and efforts to achieve this are likely to be
counterproductive.  But the Australian proposal,
made at the December 1996 Singapore WTO Ministe-
rial meeting, to engage in a negative list reporting
exercise for transparency purposes deserves to be
reconsidered.  What is required is that the prevailing
policies, which discriminate against foreign compe-
tition, are identiﬁed and that this information be
made publicly available. 
Even if it can be agreed that governments will
engage in a transparency exercise and agree to notify
their existing policies, GATT and WTO experience
suggests there will be substantial non-compliance.13
An alternative option is to give the transparency task
to a specialized body.  One such entity was created
during the Uruguay Round—the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM).14 Agreement could be sought
that as part of each country review, the TPRM make 
a comprehensive survey of the prevailing status quo
on services-related policies in each WTO member—
if necessary, drawing upon outside expertise to assist
in the preparation of the ﬁrst review for each country.
This will undoubtedly require additional resources,
which will need to be made available.  This survey
should not just cover measures in legal terms, but
also the key aspects that matter economically for
speciﬁc activities—such as interconnect rates,
licensing fees, accounting rates—and report informa-
tion on market structures, size distribution of ﬁrms,
turnover (entry, exit), etc.15 An alternative is to rely
much more on the private sector to provide infor-
mation on barriers and enhance the incentives for
private parties to use WTO dispute settlement mech-
anisms (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000).
Expanding the Coverage of the GATS
After the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994,
it rapidly became clear that the sectoral coverage of
the speciﬁc commitments on national treatment and
11 For much more comprehensive discussions of what could and
should be done to improve the GATS, see Feketekuty (1998; 2000),
Mattoo (2000), and Snape (1998). This section builds on Hoekman
(2000).
12 Defenders of the negative list respond that transition periods could
have been deﬁned during which countries could determine what
they wanted to schedule as exceptions, complemented with technical
assistance to help undertake the required policy and legislative
review exercise.
13  As is the case, e.g., with the notiﬁcation obligation to report the out-
come of bilateral settlements in disputes notiﬁed to the WTO—see
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2000).
14  See Francois (1999) for a critical discussion of the TPRM.
15  See Djankov and Hoekman (1998) for the types of data that might be
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market access was rather limited for many countries.
Also, countries that had scheduled sectors frequently
listed a variety of measures that allowed them to con-
tinue to restrict or limit either market access or
national treatment.  By one measure, high-income
countries only made commitments on about half of
all services, of which only one-half involved commit-
ments of “free access.”  Thus, there were no restrictions
on market access or national treatment for only 25
percent of all service activities.  Developing countries
made even fewer commitments.  In the case of major
developing countries, on average, “free access” com-
mitments were made for only 15 percent of the
service sector (Hoekman, 1996).  Subsequently, 
successful negotiations expanded the coverage of
speciﬁc commitments for basic telecoms and ﬁnan-
cial services.16
The stylized facts are well known:  The coverage
of speciﬁc commitments is limited for many coun-
tries, and in many cases the commitments are more
restrictive than the status quo policies that are actu-
ally applied.  That is, many governments have
refrained from binding the status quo.  Examples
pertaining to ﬁnancial services were mentioned
above, where countries scheduled foreign ownership
limits that are more restrictive than those currently
enforced, thereby providing the option to force ﬁrms
to reduce equity stakes in the future.  One interesting
feature that has been remarked upon is that more
commitments have tended to be made with respect
to FDI (“mode 3”) than cross-border trade (“mode 1”),
but that a number of countries’ commitments are
such as to favor infusions of foreign equity into
existing ﬁrms and limit the ability of entry by new
firms.  As noted by Mattoo (2000), such protection of
incumbents and/or existing market structures is difﬁ-
cult to rationalize and must be carefully monitored,
as it can easily result in a transfer of rents to foreign
firms rather than a socially desirable increase in
competition and lower prices/higher quality output.
One of the challenges confronting negotiators
will be to expand the sectoral coverage of speciﬁc
commitments.  A strong case can be made that the
GATS should cover all services.  There is no rationale
for excluding certain sectors or modes of supply
from the national-treatment and market-access disci-
plines.  Given that the GATS allows for derogations to
both principles, at the very least, comprehensive
scheduling will ensure that a government is forced to
consider the justiﬁcation and economic rationale for
the policies it maintains that are not in conformity
with these principles.  One way of moving towards
this is to apply a formula approach to expanded cov-
erage in the next round of negotiations, setting 
minimum coverage targets for GATS members, to be
attained by a speciﬁed date (which may vary depend-
ing on per-capita income level to allow for a transi-
tion period).  This could include agreement that a
speciﬁed share of all commitments involve full
binding of status quo policies.  A more ambitious
approach would be to seek agreement on a deadline
for full coverage to be reached.  It seems unlikely that
WTO members will be willing to consider moving
from a positive to a negative list approach to schedu-
ling commitments—but there is nothing to prevent
individual countries from doing so. 
Whatever formula or focal point is established
for the negotiations, individual countries should con-
sider going beyond this.  In the process, valuable
information can be obtained on how different poli-
cies affect clusters of activities that are inter-related
and interdependent.  As noted earlier, it is useful to
think and work in terms of clusters of related activi-
ties.  The current sectoral approach to scheduling
makes little economic sense as it ignores comple-
mentarities and interdependencies.  The problems
that can arise are illustrated by the examples of E-
commerce, energy services, and international express
services (see Barﬁeld and Groombridge, 1999). 
One way to reduce potential inconsistencies is to
require one-to-one mappings between commitments
relating to modes 1 and 3 (“non-discrimination across
modes”).  Such modal neutrality is an objective worth
pursuing because, as is often emphasized in the liter-
ature, trade and investment have increasingly become
complementary.  It also is frequently noted that it will
become increasingly difﬁcult to maintain a clear dis-
tinction between trade in goods and trade in services,
as technology may give producers the choice of
delivering their products in tangible or in disembo-
died (digitized) form.  A priori, it would appear that
any multilateral disciplines should apply equally to
international transactions regardless of the mode of
supply.  A case can be made that WTO members may
wish to consider developing disciplines that distinguish
between trade and investment, with trade in goods or
services being subject to a set of common rules, and
movement of factors of production being subject to
another set of rules.  This, in effect, has been the
approach taken in the NAFTA, which includes a sepa-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
16  See Cowhey and Klimenko (1999) on the telecom agreement;  Key
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r ate chapter on investment (in goods or services) and
is distinct from the rules relating to cross-border trade
(in goods and services).  Emulating this approach
would result in much greater consistency and clarity
of the applicable rules and disciplines, but clearly
goes much beyond the ambit of the GATS.  Within
the GATS, setting a focus on modal neutrality can be
a useful halfway house.
Improving the Rules
The primary disciplines embodied in the GATS
are most favored nation (MFN), market access and
national treatment—the latter two only on a sector-
mode basis, and subject to exceptions if governments
desire to schedule them.  A formula approach to
expanding sectoral coverage could be complemented
by efforts to increase the impact of multilateral disci-
plines for certain modes of supply.  Feketekuty (2000)
has argued that national treatment should become a
general principle applying to mode 3 (FDI).  If com-
bined with greater use of horizontal rules based on
pro-competitive principles, this would help make the
GATS more transparent and more relevant to inves-
tors.  Ideally, scheduling of liberalization commitments
should shift from the sectoral (speciﬁc) to the horizon-
tal (general).  This would allow negotiating efforts to
center more on developing disciplines that make
sense from a long-term growth and economic devel-
opment perspective.  In general, these are likely to
focus on safeguarding the contestability of markets,
while maintaining national sovereignty to regulate
activities to attain health, safety, prudential and
related objectives.  In this perspective, it would be
useful to consider generalizing the appropriate parts
of the so-called “Reference Paper” in telecoms to
make it a horizontal set of disciplines to be incorpo-
rated into the GATS as such.  The Reference Paper
includes concepts such as “affecting the terms of 
participation” and “essential facilities” that could use-
fully be extended to all services, even those without
any background of monopoly or public ownership 
or control.
A strict policy of MFN also is desirable. In the
Uruguay Round, countries were permitted to
schedule MFN exemptions, in part reﬂecting a 
concern by regulators that MFN might impede their
ability to intervene, or a desire by governments to
discriminate on a sectoral basis (e.g., culture).  If
deemed necessary, existing provisions in the GATS
that give regulators the ability to pursue actions that
discriminate across ﬁrms (to achieve regulatory
objectives) could be strengthened as a quid pro quo
for adoption of an unconditional, general MFN rule
(although the GATS already is quite explicit in provi-
ding a carve out for regulatory purposes).  Mandatory
MFN also should apply in the area of standards and
mutual recognition, with non-recognition being made
easier to contest through dispute settlement.  However,
it must be recognized that multilateral cooperation
may be required to mitigate the competition-reducing
effect of domestic regulations, especially in the area
of mandatory standards—for product safety, profes-
sional certiﬁcation, and prudential regulation.  This 
is perhaps the major area where future efforts at rule-
making should be focused, not least because it is one
where many countries are embarking on initiatives
to achieve “deeper integration” in the context of
regional agreements.
Finally, what about the “outstanding” issues that
were left open after the Uruguay Round and on which
little progress has been made since then: subsidies,
procurement, and safeguards?  Arguably, there is little
need for GATS-speciﬁc disciplines in any of these
areas. Procurement is a general issue, so that any dis-
ciplines should cover goods and services.  What
really matters for foreign ﬁrms is to have access to
procurement markets, and frequently this can only
be achieved if they have a commercial presence in a
country.  In economic terms, what matters is not so
much policies of discrimination, but the ability of
foreign ﬁrms to establish.  Thus, if the coverage of the
GATS is expanded and the suggestion of Feketekuty is
taken up—national treatment for mode 3—there is
little need for stand-alone services procurement dis-
ciplines (Evenett and Hoekman, 2000). 
Although multilateral disciplines on subsidies
might help avoid mutually destructive policies from
the viewpoint of developing countries—for example,
seeking to attract FDI via the use of incentives—it is
not clear that there is a signiﬁcant problem of nega-
tive spillovers (Langhammer, 1999).  Subsidies are the
source of important distortions in OECD markets for
some services such as transport.  It is very unlikely
that the GATS will be able to do much to restrain gov-
ernments.  Many studies conclude that ﬁscal incen-
tives have little if any impact on the location decisions
of foreign investors.  Even if one does not accept this
conclusion, competition (non-cooperation) could be
welfare improving for the world as a whole (Hoekman
and Saggi, 1999).  Noteworthy is that the stillborn
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) excluded
incentives, so one can infer that OECD countries are
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disciplining the use of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁscal incentives,
subsidy disciplines will have to be quite comprehen-
sive to ensure that countries cannot side-step them
through the use of alternative policies.  The GATT/
WTO negotiating and implementation history illus-
trates that agreement on subsidy and related disci-
plines is difﬁcult to obtain, and that any disciplines
may easily be circumvented.  Even the European
Union—which goes much further than the WTO 
in this area—has encountered recurrent difﬁculties
associated with government policies intended to
attract FDI and enforce its restrictions on the use 
of State aids.  NAFTA does not even try to tackle this
issue.  All in all, Snape’s (1987) prescription for “sub-
sidy freedom” seems the best way to proceed in this
area.  In any event, the same conclusion arises as for
procurement—any disciplines should be general, not
sector-speciﬁc.
It also can be argued that there is no need for
safeguards instruments.  Insofar as governments
want to “backslide,” they can make recourse to rene-
gotiation modalities that already are built into the
GATS.  GATT-type safeguards (emergency protection)
are difﬁcult to rationalize in the services context
because in many cases it will require taking action
against foreign ﬁrms that have established a com-
mercial presence.  Why a government would want 
to do this is unclear, as it will deter, not attract, FDI.  
If it is to be considered, it would most likely have to
exempt mode 3.  But, then it must be considered that
safeguards (or their threat) can easily act as an invest-
ment incentive, and result in resource allocation dis-
tortions.  There is, however, a potentially compelling
counter argument.  A case could be made that the
extremely limited nature of liberalization commit-
ments to date is in part due to the non-existence of
safeguards instruments.  This is most likely to apply
to mode 4—temporary movement of service provi-
ders.  As this mode of supply is of major interest to
developing countries and one on which almost all
countries maintain stringent restrictions, one could
envisage a safeguard instrument that is limited to
mode 4 liberalization commitments, and is explicitly
aimed at providing OECD country governments with
an insurance mechanism that can be invoked if liber-
alization has unexpected detrimental impacts on
their societies.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Many observers have noted that the GATS is an
imperfect instrument (e.g., Hoekman, 1996; Snape,
1998).  Notwithstanding the deﬁciencies, it can be
used as a commitment and signaling device by gov-
ernments that have decided that regulatory reforms
are in the national interest.  Speciﬁc commitments
can be made for all modes of supply, including FDI,
and governments that have decided to open access 
to services markets to foreign providers should
pursue the option of locking-in policy reforms as
much as possible through the existing GATS mecha-
nisms.  Future efforts to expand GATS disciplines
should center on expanding the sectoral coverage 
of the agreement and simplifying and strengthening
the rules along the lines discussed previously. 
There are undoubtedly gains from enhancing
competition in service markets.  Recent theoretical
and numerical research, some of which was dis-
cussed earlier, clearly reveal that the gains can be
quite large.  To a large extent these payoffs can be
realized through autonomous reform efforts, and
many countries have been pursuing reforms more
vigorously in the last decade.  The major challenge
confronting negotiators in the next round may be to
create incentives for developing countries to expand
their commitments under the GATS.  Given ongoing
efforts in many countries to adopt a more market
and pro-competitive policy stance, the focus of atten-
tion can be expected to center on increasing the
extent to which both the status quo and future
(autonomous) reforms are scheduled in the GATS.
This depends importantly on the value that is placed
on such scheduling by reforming economies them-
selves and the “demandeur” countries that want
governments to lock-in reforms in the GATS.  Argu-
ments by economists that the WTO can be used as a
valuable credibility-bolstering device have proven to
be less than compelling to policymakers.  Thus, the
mercantilist logic of multilateral negotiations is likely
to require that industrialized countries improve
export market access opportunities for developing
countries.  Absent such a quid pro quo it may prove
difﬁcult to greatly expand the coverage of the GATS 
in areas where the economic payoffs are highest—
sectors where entry restrictions are most severe or
the perceived probability of policy reversal is high.
There is a great need for more and better surveil-
lance and monitoring of the prevalence and effects of
policies that imply discrimination against foreign com-
petitors in service sectors.  Bolstering the transparency
and information collection and dissemination func-
tions of the WTO Secretariat would help improve
matters.  Although much has been done since the
creation of the WTO to increase access to ofﬁcial
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documents, less has been achieved in the area of
data and statistics.  WTO databases of trade and
tariff information are not publicly accessible. Trade
policy reviews are not posted on the web, nor are the
underlying data that are used in the reports.  Even if
agreement is reached among WTO members to pro-
vide comprehensive reports on their prevailing
services policy regimes for transparency purposes, to
be most useful this data should be put into the public
domain.  Requiring the WTO Secretariat to compile
and distribute data that is reported to it, both policy-
oriented and statistics, and making this information
available free of charge through the Web, can be
defended as a public good that the institution has a
mandate to provide.
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